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ARTICLES
FAILURE TO PREPARE: WHO'S LIABLE IN A
DATA PROCESSING DISASTER?
Dan L. Burkt
Laurence H. Winertt
INTRODUCTION
In December 1986, fire in the building housing the Boston of-
fices of Putnam Cos., cut off power to the investment management
firm's computer center.' In June 1987, floods in Chicago inundated
the data processing center at Household Finance Corp., leaving fish
swimming through the company's computers.2 In October 1987, an
earthquake in Los Angeles paralyzed the data processing center of
California Federal Savings and Loan, separating the bank's numer-
ous branches from customer account records.3 In each case, a po-
tentially crippling disaster was avoided by moving data processing
operations to an alternate computer site. Each firm had previously
prepared a computer disaster recovery plan.
What if no contingency plans had been made? Modem corpo-
rations, dealing in every service from banking to utilities, have be-
come increasingly dependent on their electronic data processing
systems.4 Loss of those systems can stall the critical functions of a
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1. Koselka, Blue-chip Back-up, FORBES, Jan. 26, 1987, at 80.
2. Bozman, It Was a Dark & Rainy Night, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 29, 1988, at 14,
col. 1. See also Robbins, Disaster Recovery: Trial by Flood, INFOSYsTEMs, Jan. 1988, at 40.
3. Back-up Site Allows Quick Recovery, SAVINGS INST., Dec. 1987, at 136 [hereinafter
Back-up Site].
4. For an overview of various applications, see generally Industry by Industry Technol-
ogy Forecast, DATAMATION, Jan. 15, 1988, at 58-92.
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firm, destroy vital records, and cause costly delays.5 A nine hour
shutdown of one bank's computer facilities reportedly caused losses
of over $1,000,000.6 A computer system failure at the Bank of New
York cost the bank $4,000,000 during the several days required for
repair.7 Electronic data processing has brought with it many ad-
vantages, but also a special type of vulnerability: records which
consist of no more than an electrical impulse are easily destroyed.'
Business insurance may cover the cost of computer hardware
replacement, or even the losses incurred while a computer is down
and business is interrupted.9 However, even this safeguard may
have become inadequate.'° A recent University of Texas study indi-
cates that 75% of computer dependent businesses would suffer crip-
pling losses if deprived of their electronic data processing systems
for more than 14 days." Some firms might be out of business
within a week.' 2 A previous study conducted by the University of
Minnesota suggested that certain corporations would suffer perma-
nently disabling loss after only 48 hours without operational corn-
5. See Safety In Numbers, COMPUTERWORLD FoCus, April 6, 1988, at 40 (1986 pro-
jection of electronic data processing disaster costs).
6. West, Disaster Prevention and Recovery Options for Check Processing, MAO. BANK
ADMIN., June 8, 1985, at 64.
7. Betts, Bank Blames Nightmare on Software Flop, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 16, 1985
at 1, col. 3; Goldberg, DP Nightmare Hits NYBank, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 16, 1985, at 1,
col. 3. These losses were caused by software failure rather than some natural disaster, but
illustrate what may occur when businesses are unexpectedly deprived of their electronic data
processing capability.
8. See Carter, Loss of Memory: An Unforgettable Experience, AcCT., March 1987, at
144.
9. Insurance is available to cover the cost of replacing damaged computer hardware
and software, as well as costs of extra expenses such as moving to an alternative data process-
ing facility. See Rating Your Risks, DATAMATION, Feb. 1, 1987, at 62; see also Passori, Con-
tingency Planning Options Protect Corporate Data Assets, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 27, 1986,
at 74, col. 4. Business interruption insurance may cover lost revenues directly related to data
processing.
However, determining exactly which losses are within the coverage of such insurance
may be a difficult and unsatisfactory process for all parties involved. See also generally,
Detamore, Functional Value vs. Actual Cash Value in Partial Loss Settlements, 50 INS.
COUNS. J. 332 (1983); Hoey, Ozog & Schaefle, Management of a Complex Business Interrup-
tion Case, 52 INS. COUNS. J. 669 (1985).
10. ,Uninsured intangible losses such as cash flow interruption, loss of market share, loss
of competitive edge, or decrease in customer confidence may cause the greatest damage to a
business that unexpectedly loses its electronic data processing capacity. S. CHRISTENSEN &
L. SCHKADE, FINANCIAL AND FUNCTIONAL IMPACTS OF COMPUTER OUTAGES ON BUSI-
NESS, CRIs-87-01, at 10 (1987) (Center for Research on Information Systems).
11. Id., at 11. See also Wall, Few Firms Plan Well for Mishaps that Disable Computer
Facilities, Wall St. J., May 31, 1988, at 27, col. 4.
12. Wall, supra note 11, at col. 4.
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puter facilities.13 Because of such studies, corporate officers have
begun to realize that their corporation's electronic records are per-
haps their firm's most valuable asset - and their most
vulnerable. 1
4
In the face of such vulnerability, many firms are investing in a
different sort of insurance. Corporations that rely heavily on elec-
tronic data processing operations have begun to build or lease alter-
nate computer sites for use during a disaster.15 Highly publicized
events such as the computer disasters discussed above have alerted
many corporate executives to their firms' vulnerability.16 New serv-
ices have appeared to supply the disaster recovery market; these
services have been widely discussed in the popular press. 17 Federal
agencies have begun to take notice of this problem,1 8 and support
groups have sprung up to aid the managers who prepare and imple-
ment computer disaster recovery plans.1 9
Despite the widespread discussion of computer disaster recov-
ery, many corporate directors and officers remain oblivious or hos-
tile to discussion of such plans.20 Tales of information systems
managers whose prophecies of doom went unheeded by corporate
executives are well known in data processing circles.21 Often, execu-
tives are unwilling to commit time or money to prepare for a com-
puter disaster - yet the disaster, if it strikes, could close the doors
of their business forever.22 As one standard text on computer audit
13. Regulations Demand Sold Planning For Disaster Recovery, SAVINGS INST., Sept.
1987, at 115 [hereinafter Regulations].
14. See Wall, supra note 11, at col. 5 ("... the value of the information (in the com-
puter) could very well be worth several times the value of their hardware, software, and
building,' says Steven Christiansen, a researcher at the University of Texas."). See also Pas-
sod, supra note 9, at 73, col. 1; Usdin, Like It or Not, Plan for Disaster Recovery, OFFICE,
March 1987, at 90.
15. See Wall, supra note 11, at col. 5; see also Elliott, A New Kind of Recovery Service,
AccT., Feb. 1986, at 121 (description of British disaster recovery industry).
16. Rohm, That's All That's Left, INFoSYSTEMS, Feb. 1987, at 48.
17. See, e.g., Koselka, supra note 1; Marbach, Leech & Gibney, Now, Computer
Paramedics, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 28, 1987, at 38; Wall, supra note 11, at col. 5.
18. See infra notes 115-133 and accompanying text.
19. Ludlum, Contingency Groups Spring Up, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 7, 1987, at 77,
col. 2; Robbins, Disaster Recovery: No Longer the Loneliest People in the World, INFOSYS-
TEMS, June 1987, at 38.
20. See Dugan, Disaster Recovery Planning: Crisis Doesn't Equal Catastrophe, CoM-
PUTERWORLD, Jan. 27, 1986, at 67, col. 2; at 69, col. 1. See also Wierzbicki, Preparing for
Catastrophe: You Can't Dodge the Bullet, COMPUTERWORLD, May 12, 1986, at 58, col. 1
(interview with Comdisco president Raymond Hipp).
21. See Pedigo, Disaster Recovery: Making Plans That Could Save Your Company,
COMPUTERWORLD, May 12, 1986, at 49, col. 1; Stamps, Disaster Recovery: Who's Worried?,
DATAMATION, Feb. 1, 1987, at 60.
22. See generally Carter, supra note 8; see also supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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observes in discussing disaster recovery:
In evaluating the threat of computer disaster, consider the
following parallels: Would it be prudent to leave unsecured such
physical documents as the corporate general ledger, journals,
subsidiary ledgers, and source documents? Would it be standard
practice to leave millions of dollars in cash or negotiable instru-
ments unprotected, in one room?...
The failure to institute adequate safeguards in each of these
cases would be downright negligent. However, in general, infor-
mation assets are left relatively unsecured in centralized comput-
ing facilities. . . . In effect, the "corporate memory" of the
organization is being exposed to accidental loss.... 23
What duties do corporate executives owe their corporations,
shareholders, depositors, creditors, or customers regarding com-
puter disaster recovery? This paper examines whether failure to
take adequate precautions for computer disaster recovery consti-
tutes negligence not only in the everyday sense, but in the legal
sense as well. Such legal negligence might leave corporations, direc-
tors, and officers liable for certain damages suffered due to inacces-
sibility or loss of records and data processing capacity during a
computer disaster. Part I of this paper discusses the disaster recov-
ery options available to corporations. Part II outlines corporate lia-
bility under several statutes requiring computer disaster
preparedness. Part III discusses the common law duties of corpora-
tions, directors, and officers as applied to this topic. Finally, Part
IV suggests a theory of tort liability that might be applied to losses
in computer disaster, and indicates areas to which this theory might
extend.
I. PREPARING FOR COMPUTER DISASTER
A. Economic Considerations
Preparing a computer disaster recovery plan, like making any
other business judgment, requires that corporate officers and direc-
tors weigh several competing economic considerations.24 Computer
problems come in many sizes and shapes. Generally, the cost of a
precautionary measure will be a function of the frequency and se-
23. F. GALLEGOS, D. RICHARDSON, & A. BORTHICK, AUDIT AND CONTROL OF IN-
FORMATION SYSTEMS 96 (1987).
24. See West, supra note 6, at 65; Sporck, Without a Records Recovery Plan, Start From
Square One, OFFICE, June 1987, at 57; see also Murray, How Much is Enough? Expert Says
Security Efforts Should Pay, Not Cost, COMPUTERWORLD FOCUS, April 6, 1988, at 30, col. 1.
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verity of the disaster guarded against.2" Some precautionary meas-
ures may be taken to avert mishaps; other measures must be
designed to speed recovery from an unavoidable disaster. The size
of the firm, its dependence on electronic data processing, and the
resources available to commit to disaster preparedness must all be
considered. In addition, legal and regulatory requirements must be
considered.26
Certain computer mishaps are fairly likely to occur: data entry
mistakes, a power surge, or a minor software error might be com-
mon examples of this type of problem.27 These problems are dis-
ruptive, but rarely result in thorough devastation.2" They can
usually be dealt with by relatively inexpensive preventive measures.
For example, protective devices are commonly used to prevent cur-
rent fluctuations from destroying electronic data.29 Backup copying
of data remains the least expensive but most effective form of elec-
tronic data protection;30 even offices with small data processing
needs quickly learn the importance of frequently updating duplicate
copies of important files and software.3 Indeed, more sophisticated
forms of computer protection rely largely on the simple measure of
creating backup files.32
Other computer mishaps may be either too improbable or too
costly to prepare for; falling meteors or a thermonuclear terrorist
attack might fall into this category. Generally, the resources ex-
pended in preventing this type of disaster will outweigh any benefit
25. See Sporck, supra note 24, at 57; West, supra note 6, at 65; see also Murray, supra
note 24, at col. 4.
26. See infra discussion in Part II.
27. See Murray, supra note 24, at col. 4; Safety, In Numbers, supra note 5.
28. Disruptions such as major software failure, of course, can be extremely costly, as in
the instance reported supra at note 7. However, even in such instances the hardware and data
processing site remain intact for recovery.
29. See Kolodziej, The Ins and Outs of UPS, COMPUTERWORLD Focus, April 6, 1988,
at 26; Rhodes, An Electifying Situation, INFOSYSTEMS, Dec. 1986, at 48.
30. See Robbins, Disaster Recovery: Don't Stuff Your Backup Tapes in a Box and Stash
Them in a Cave, INFOSYSTEMs, Aug. 1987, at 18; see also Innovation Data Processing v.
IBM, 585 F. Supp. 1470, 1473 (D.C.N.J. 1984) (recognizing importance of back-up).
31. Robbins, supra note 30, at 18. Even the simple precaution of data backup requires
costs and benefits to be weighed. Firms must weigh benefits against inconvenience in choosing
how often to update backup files. Electronic vaulting technologies allow virtually continual
instantaneous file backup, but the cost is often prohibitive. See Schreider, If You Can't Afford
to Wait.. ., COMPtJTERWORLD SPOTLIGHT No. 48, July 11, 1988, at S-11.
32. Schreider, supra note 31, at S- 11. See also Elliott, supra note 15, at 122; Sherman, Is
Your Vital Information Protected?, ADMIN. MGMT., June 1986, at 50, 51; Whitehead &
Conyers, Survival in a Computer Environment - The Synergistic Approach, ARMA REC.
MGMT. Q., Jan. 1988, at 12.
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gained."3 This may not be true, of course, for certain large firms
that are highly dependant on uninterrupted data processing. Amer-
ican Airlines, for example, recently completed an underground
computer center with sophisticated personnel security screening de-
vices.3 4 The center has a food stockpile as well as a fuel supply to
power its own electrical generators.35 This center houses the nexus
of the Sabre computer network, which every hour processes
thousands of airline reservations from all over the world.36 A hand-
ful of other firms have constructed similar "disaster proof" sites,
but such measures are the exception, rather than the rule.
3 7
Computer disaster recovery plans deal generally with protec-
tion between these two extremes.3 8 Fire, floods, earthquakes, and
tornadoes strike infrequently, but have a devastating impact when
they do strike. Computer dependent firms with sufficient resources
may adopt strategies to enable them to recover from a disaster too
costly to prevent.3 9 Small firms may not have this option; often
they must rely on inexpensive preventive measures, and take their
chances with the threat of large scale disaster. Larger corporations,
with more resources at stake, also have more resources to commit
to developing disaster recovery measures. These measures generally
involve off-site storage of frequently updated files and programs, as
well as provisions to use duplicate critical computer functions off-
site if a disaster strikes.' Such a plan ensures not only that elec-
tronic records are preserved through a disaster, but that they are
accessible afterward. These measures may be implemented in sev-
eral ways.
B. Disaster Recovery Options
Hot Sites - A hot site is a fully equipped computer facility to
which data processing operations may be transferred in the event of
33. See Murray, supra note 24, at 30; Sporck, supra note 24, at 58; West, supra note 6,
at 65.
34. See Marbach, Leech & Gibney, supra note 17.
35. Id.
36. See Stamps, supra note 21, at 64.
37. Id.
38. See West, supra note 6, at 65.
39. The considerations discussed here are also weighed in determining the scope and
cost of insurance against a disaster. Thus, implementation of adequate disaster precautions
will often save a firm money on disaster insurance premiums, simply by eliminating negative
factors that an insurer will consider. See Rating Your Risks, supra note 9.
40. See generally Ainsworth, Contingency Options Abound With Off-site Backup Facili-
ties, COMPUTERWORLD, May 12, 1986, at 56, col. 1.
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a disaster.41 This disaster recovery option has been perhaps the
most highly publicized.42 Several firms offer hot site subscriptions
commercially; the largest of these are SunGard Data Systems Inc.
and Comdisco Inc. Each firm maintains several operational com-
puter facilities in different areas of the United States, Canada and
Europe.43 In addition, a number of smaller disaster recovery ser-
vice firms offer more limited computer facilities locally.' Corpora-
tions subscribe to whichever service maintains equipment
compatible to the corporation's own.4 SunGard, with about 400
customers, caters primarily to larger corporations requiring large
capacity mainframe computers.46 Comdisco, with about 700 cus-
'tomers, provides backup facilities to mid-sized firms with more
moderate computer hardware needs.47
Hot-site subscriptions generally are not recommended for
smaller corporations or firms with little need for telecommunica-
tions.48 Part of the reason is the price; firms subscribing to these
services pay a monthly fee which may range from $1,500 to
$100,000. 4" The amount paid depends upon the type of equipment
and service desired.50 Subscribing firms also pay a disaster declara-
tion fee of $10,000 to $50,000 in order to gain access to the facility
in a disaster; additional fees are assessed while the facility is actually
in use.51 The disaster recovery service firms typically contract with
several corporations in the same area for use of the same sites.5 2 In
an area wide disaster, some services assign facilities on a "first
come, first served" basis; others guarantee equal access and shared
41. Hot sites generally contain one or more mainframe computers, peripheral devices,
and necessary telecommunication equipment. See Ainsworth, supra note 40, at 56, col. 3; see
also Elliott, supra note 15, at 122. Some commercial services have begun offering "warm
sites" containing everything but the mainframe. See Ainsworth, supra note 40, at 57.
42. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
43. See Disaster Prevention and Recovery, COMPUTERWORLD SPOTLIGHT No. 48, July
11, 1988, at S-14 [hereinafter Disaster Prevention].
44. Id.
45. See Scisco, Approach Your Hot Site as Home Away From Home, COMPUTERWORLD
SPOTLIGHT No. 48, July 11, 1988, at S-5, col. 1.
46. See Disaster Prevention, supra note 43.
47. Id.
48. See Robbins, supra note 2, at 45.
49. See Marbach, Leech & Gibney, supra note 17; Wall, supra note 11.
50. See Regulations, supra note 13, at 117; Stamps, supra note 21, at 63. The services
offered may include even meals and toothbrushes for displaced personnel. See Raimondi, Hot
Sites: Disaster Plan Douses Flames, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 17, 1986, at 6, col. 3.
51. Raimondi, supra note 50 at 1, col. 2.
52. See Bozman, supra note 2; Bozman, DP Sites Drip-dry in Chicago, CoM-
PUTERWORLD, Aug. 24, 1987, at 1, col. 2; at 4, col. 2.
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usage." During 1987 flooding in the Chicago area, three of Corn-
disco's customers declared disasters. The Comdisco facilities in the
area were adequate for only two; tapes and personnel from the third
were airlifted to another site in Pennsylvania. 4
Corporations with highly specialized needs may also find hot
site subscriptions to be undesirable. Specialized equipment, such as
the check processing machinery used by banks, may not be avail-
able at commercial hot sites.55 Security at a commercial hot site
may be inadequate for some firm's needs. 6 The inconvenience of
moving records and personnel to a somewhat distant hot site may
also be undesirable, although remote access telecommunications
have begun to alleviate this problem. 7 The last problem has been
addressed to some extent by service firms offering mobile hot sites,
which they drive to the parking lot of the subscriber's damaged
computer center.58
Cold Sites - A cold site, or shell, is simply a facility ready for
the installation of computer hardware. 9 A corporation may sub-
scribe to a cold site service in much the same manner it would sub-
scribe to a hot site; both types of service are offered by SunGard and
Comdisco.60 The costs for cold site subscription, however, are con-
siderably less; no expensive computer equipment is maintained in
readiness at the facility.61 In an emergency, the subscribing corpo-
ration must contact its computer hardware vendor to deliver dupli-
cate equipment to the cold site; the necessary air conditioning,
temperature control, electrical cables, and telecommunication
hook-ups are available at the cold site.62 This option is attractive
because its cost is minimal until a disaster actually occurs. In addi-
tion, some firms may have need of highly specialized equipment
that would not be available at a commercial hot site; these corpora-
tions may tailor the equipment at the cold site to their needs, rather
than maintain a private facility year round.63
However, two serious disadvantages to cold sites prevent most
corporations from seriously considering this option to computer
53. Bozman, supra note 52, at col. 3.
54. Id.
55. See West, supra note 6, at 72.
56. See id.
57. See id.; see also Ainsworth, supra note 40.
58. See Rohm, supra note 16, at 46.
59. Ainsworth, supra note 40, at 57.
60. See Disaster Prevention, supra note 43, at S-14.
61. See Regulations, supra note 13, at 116.
62. Passori, supra note 9, at 73, col. 3.
63. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 5
F8L URE TO PREPARE
disaster recovery. First, a recovery plan that centers around a cold
site cannot be tested.' No equipment is available at the site, until
ordered in an actual disaster. Computer personnel will therefore
have no experience reestablishing full data processing operations at
the new site, under time pressure. Far more prohibitive, though, is
the delay in delivery of the duplicate equipment to the site. Ten to
twenty-seven days may be required for a vendor to deliver computer
hardware to the cold site.6 5 In an actual emergency, loss of data
processing for this period of time would seriously cripple or destroy
most corporate operations.66
Reciprocity Agreements - Some corporations may choose not
to contract for disaster recovery sites, but may instead enter into a
reciprocity agreement with another firm.67 Under such an agree-
ment, each firm agrees to allow the other to use its computing facili-
ties in the event of a disaster.68 This "buddy system" is possible
only if a corporation can find another that uses the same computer
hardware and software. 69 Reciprocity agreements are attractive be-
cause they offer corporations a measure of security without the sub-
scription and disaster declaration fees of commercial hot or cold site
contracts. 70  These agreements have traditionally been the most
common type of disaster recovery plan.71
In practice, however, relying on a reciprocity agreement may
be tantamount to relying on no disaster recovery plan at all.72 Such
agreements assume, first, that at least one of the firms entering the
agreement will be unaffected by whatever disaster overtakes the
other. More important, these agreements assume that the computer
facilities at the unaffected firm have sufficient operating capacity to
accommodate the demands of both firmS.73 This is rarely the case,
and where demand for computer time is greater than can be met,
the "nonresident" firm's needs may have to wait.74 Maintaining
compatibility between the data processing operations at each firm
64. Passori, supra note 9, at 73, col. 3.
65. See Regulations, supra note 13, at 116; West, supra note 6, at 72.
66. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
67. See Ainsworth, supra note 40, at 56.
68. Id. See also Passori, supra note 9, at 73, col. 1.
69. See Chung, Contingency Planning: A Funds Transfer Perspective, MAG. BANK AD-
MIN., Sept. 1987, 16, 18.
70. See Usdin, supra note 14, at 90.
71. Melia, Auditor Devises Disaster Plan, SAVINGS INST., Sept. 1987, at S-72.
72. See Whitehead & Conyers, supra note 32, at 12. See also Wierzbicki, supra note 20,
at 58, col. 4.
73. See Whitehead & Conyers, supra note 32, at 12; Wierzbicki, supra note 20, at 58,
col. 4; see also Stamps, supra note 19, at 63; Usdin, supra note 14, at 90.
74. See Wierzbicki, supra note 20, at 58, col. 4; see also Usdin, supra note 14, at 90.
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may also become a serious problem." Experts in disaster planning
charge that reciprocity agreements offer only a false sense of secur-
ity; the agreements are a panacea for corporations wishing to avoid
the unpleasant realities of disaster recovery planning.76 Nonethe-
less, such agreements may be the only viable option for small
firms.
7 7
Service Bureaus - Service bureaus perform data processing
jobs for a fee. 78 Corporations without internal data processing ca-
pability routinely send such work to a service bureau. 79 Corpora-
tions that normally have internal data processing capability
sometimes plan to send data processing out to a service bureau
should a computer disaster strike." This approach avoids the costs
of subscription to a hot site or the cost of maintaining a private
backup facility. The only costs are the fee paid to the service bu-
reau for work done after a disaster actually occurs.
However, the advantages of internal data processing capability
are lost when processing is turned over to an outside service. Cor-
porations with internal data processing usually purchased their own
computers because the volume of work done makes buying the
equipment cost effective. When that volume of work is sent to an
outside service, for even a short time, costs rapidly mount."' In
addition, reliability, control, and secrecy may be sacrificed by turn-
ing data processing over to a service bureau. A corporation accus-
tomed to performing its own data processing may not have
previously worked with a service bureau. The bureau will be unfa-
miliar with that corporation's specialized needs, causing confusion,
error, and delay.82 These factors make reliance on service bureaus a
more worthwhile option only for smaller firms with more limited
means and needs. 3
Private Facilities - Corporations such as Motorola and
BankAmerica have chosen the most direct approach to disaster re-
75. See Usdin, supra note 14, at 90.
76. See Scisco, No Such Thing as a Small Mishap, COMPUTERWORLD SPOTLIGHT No.
48, July 11, 1988, at S-1, S-6, col. 4; see also Wierzbicki, supra note 20, at 58, col. 4; Usdin,
supra note 14, at 90.
77. See Usdin, supra note 14, at 90.
78. See Whitehead & Conyers, supra note 32, at 8, 9.
79. Id.; see also Passori, supra note 9, at 74, col. 1.
80. See Passori, supra note 9, at col. 1.
81. Id.
82. Id.; see also Scisco, supra note 76, at S-6, col. 5.
83. See Scisco, supra note 76, at S-6, col. 5.; See also Whitehead & Conyers, supra note
32, at 8, 9.
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covery: they have built their own duplicate backup facilities.84 This
approach assures that the alternate facilities are tailored to the cor-
porations needs. The problem of "first come first served" availabil-
ity is also avoided by such an approach. However, the cost of
building and maintaining a duplicate facility against a somewhat
remote catastrophe can be prohibitive.85 This option is therefore
best suited to firms with extensive resources, particularly where
their computing needs are so specialized as to preclude subscription
to a general purpose commercial facility.86
Even large corporations, though, have difficulty justifying the
expense of maintaining an idle facility against the somewhat remote
contingency of a debilitating data processing catastrophe.87 Idle
equipment in a large organization tends to become occupied for one
project or another; when this occurs, the facility may not be avail-
able during the emergency for which it was built.88 Some corpora-
tions have therefore attempted to defray the expense of maintaining
alternate facilities by banding together and maintaining the facility
as a consortium.89 Similarly, the cost of a private facility may also
be lessened by contracting it out as a hot site for other firms.90 This
approach is perhaps the most viable alternative to a commercial
hot-site subscription, although it may be subject to the same com-
patability concerns as reciprocity agreements.91
C. Disaster Recovery Agreements
Many of the considerations embodied in the written agreement
for a disaster recovery site must also be weighed when evaluating a
corporation's options.92 The provisions of the agreement a firm en-
ters will cover more than simply fees, particularly if the agreement
concerns a commercial recovery service subscription. These agree-
ments will define the scope of services provided: the type of site, the
equipment and personnel available, transportation, or other ar-
84. See Stamps, supra note 21, at 63; Wall, supra note 9, at 32, col. 5.
85. See Passori, supra note 9, at 73, col. 1.
86. See West, supra note 6, at 72.
87. See Passori, Protecting Your Corporate Computer Assets, DISASTER RECOVERY J.,
July/Aug./Sept. 1988, at 30, 34.
88. See Ainsworth, supra note 40, at 56, col. 1; Wierzbicki, supra note 20, at 58, col. 4.
89. See Regulations, supra note 13, at 116.
90. See Back-up Site, supra note 3, at 137; Selling Disaster Recovery Services Helps Pay
Bills, SAVINGS INST., Sept. 1987, at 115.
91. See Stamps, supra note 21, at 63; Passori, supra note 87, at 34.
92. See Ainsworth, supra note 40, at 57, col. 4.
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rangements as described above.93 If the agreement is a hot site sub-
scription, it should make provisions for testing, particularly if
equipment or software is upgraded or replaced.94 The agreements
will also define what may constitute a disaster, how soon and how
long a subscriber may use the facilities in the event of a disaster, and
the number of subscribers that may contract to use the same site.95
In addition, the agreement may disclaim the service firm's ability to
provide immediate, continual, or exclusive access to the facilities; it
will probably limit the liability of the service firm to specific and
direct damages arising from use of the facility provided.96 Usually,
the subscriber will be required to indemnify the service firm against
third party claims arising from use of the facilities provided.97
II. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Selected provisions of federal and state statutes address matters
involving preparation for computer disaster recovery. Failure to
meet the disaster recovery planning requirements of these provi-
sions may give rise to criminal or civil liability.98 In addition,
courts may consider the standards set by these laws in formulating a
common law theory of negligence.99
A. Corporations Generally
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act - Corporations are heavily reg-
ulated entities, particularly at the federal level. As discussed above,
corporations are highly dependent on computers and electronic
records, and these records are highly vulnerable to destruction in a
disaster. Yet, no federal law appears to address this issue directly.
The federal law that appears most applicable to computer disaster
recovery for corporations generally was actually enacted for a very
different purpose.
Commentators discussing computer disaster recovery generally
agree that section 13 (b)(2) of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 (FCPA) may be read to require executives of public companies
to take reasonable precautions to preserve computer records from
93. Id. See also Raysman & Brown, Disaster Recovery Services Agreements, N.Y.L.J.,
May 14, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
94. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 93, at 30, col. 3.
95. Id. at 30, col. 2.
96. Id. See also Ainsworth, supra note 40, at 57, col. 4.
97. See Raysman & Brown, supra note 93, at 30, col. 2.
98. See infra notes 111 and 157 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 206-210 and accompanying text.
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destruction."c The FCPA was originally intended to curb foreign
bribery, safeguard corporate assets,101 and so protect the reliance of
investors."0 2 To accomplish its purpose, the FCPA requires that
corporations establish procedures to preserve accurate records and
allow reliable auditing.0 3 The language of this provision, however,
maybe interpreted to give the Act enormous scope."° The FCPA's
internal audit and control requirements could conceivably extend
into every aspect of corporate operations, leading some commenta-
tors to wonder if it provides the basis for a federal law of corpora-
tions.10 The language of the statute would likely extend to require
proper control and safeguards for a corporation's immensely valua-
ble electronic data processing assets. 106
Courts that have thus far interpreted this statute's language
have already indicated that its requirements apply not only to writ-
ten documents, but to the preservation of accurate computer
records as well.1 7 For example, in S.E.C. v. World- Wide Coin In-
100. See Sherman, supra note 32, at 51; West, supra note 6, at 62; Whitehead & Conyers,
supra note 32, at 9.
101. See Siedel, Internal Accounting Controls Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A
Federal Law of Corporations?, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 443, 463, 473 (1981).
102. SEC v. World Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 746 (N.D. Ga.
1983); Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1333 (D. Cal. 1985).
103. 15 USC § 78m(b)(2) (1982) reads in pertinent part:
(2) Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 781 of this
title and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section 780(d) of this title
shall -
(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, ac-
curately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to pro-
vide reasonable assurances that -
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or
specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of finan-
cial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any
other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability for
assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's gen-
eral or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with existing assets at
reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.
104. Siedel, supra note 101, at 444.
105. Id.
106. Guidelines issued by other federal agencies have already explicitly recognized com-
puter disaster recovery planning as a necessary extension of a firm's internal control and
physical security. See infra notes 127 and 131 and accompanying text.
107. World Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. at 749; see also ABA Committee
on Corporate Law, A Guide to the New Section 13(b)(2) Accounting Requirements of the
FCPA, 34 Bus. LAw., 301, 324 (1978) [hereinafter Guide] (standards evolving to include data
processing).
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vestments, Ltd. the court interpreted the FCPA to require "reason-
able" assurances of accuracy.10 8 The court defined "reasonable" on
the basis of economic cost/benefit analysis: implementation of the
required procedures was not to create a fail safe system at all costs;
rather, the costs should not exceed the expected benefits.10 9 This
sort of evaluation suggests that factors of computer record vulnera-
bility should be weighed in the manner discussed above for evaluat-
ing a firm's disaster recovery needs. 10 Presumably, then, some
corporations will need no more than frequent file backup; others
may require alternate computer facilities to meet the statute's
requirements.
Corporate executives who fail to determine the proper measure
of disaster recovery preparation could become subject to certain
criminal penalties. The Securities Exchange Commission, in en-
forcing this statute, may seek injunction against noncompliance, in-
stitute administrative proceedings, or even institute criminal
proceedings. 11 The FCPA requires willful or knowing violation of
its provisions before liability attaches.112 Under the latter standard,
however, corporate officers and directors need not intend to violate
the statute in order to be guilty of violating its requirements; no
scienter is required.113 The FCPA does not provide for civil penal-
ties, however; courts have held that the statute creates no private
cause of action for injured parties such as investors, shareholders, or
customers. 
1 14
SEC regulations - Certain other regulations enforced by the
Securities Exchange Commission suggest the need for particular in-
stitutions to prepare an adequate disaster recovery plan. Invest-
ment companies and investment advisers are required by federal law
to maintain accurate records of their transactions.I 5 The SEC has
recently approved storage of such records on computer media, sub-
ject to certain restrictions. 6 Both types of firms must maintain
108. World Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. at 751; see also Guide, supra note
107, at 319.
109. World Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. at 751.
110. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
111. See Guide, supra note 107, at 318-19.
112. 15 USC § 78m(a) (1982).
113. 15 USC § 78m(b)(2)(B) (1982); see also World Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 567
F. Supp., at 749 (scienter not required).
114. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. at 1332.
115. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.31a-2, 275.204-2 (1988).
116. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.31a-2(f), 275.204-2(g); see also Investment Companies May Keep
Records on Microfilm, Computer Tapes, 17 SEc. REG. L. REP. (BNA) 64 (1985); SEC Pro-
poses Allowing Mutual Funds to Keep Records on Magnetic Disk, Tapes, 18 SEc. REG. L.
REP. (BNA) 942 (1986).
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separate back-up records, although these need not necessarily be
stored off-site."17 The details of storing and updating the duplicate
records are left to the firms' determination."' Investment advisers
must make "adequate provisions" to promptly furnish SEC examin-
ers with such records. 19 The records must be made available
within twenty-four hours, except in unusual circumstances." 0 Both
types of firm must "reasonably safeguard" and be "ready at all
times" to provide the required records.12 1
These regulations clearly require investment and investment
adviser firms to create backup records - a disaster preventive
measure. Requiring the records to be promptly available suggests
the necessity of disaster recovery measures; while a computer disas-
ter is certainly an "unusual circumstance," such an event could
make the required records unavailable for weeks.122  However,
these regulations, much like the requirements of the FCPA, place
on the affected corporations the burden of determining what pre-
ventive or recovery measures are necessary. The measures em-
ployed must again be "reasonable," suggesting that the same sort of
cost/benefit analysis necessary under the FCPA will be necessary
here.
2 3
B. Banks and Financial Institutions
Federal regulatory agencies - Banks and similar financial in-
stitutions have received particular attention in the matter of com-
puter disaster recovery, perhaps because of the fiduciary or trustee
role they perform. In 1983, the Comptroller of the Currency first
recognized the dependence of the banking industry on electronic
data processing, and urged the development of contingency plans in
case of emergency.' 24 Since that time, the Office of the Comptroller
(OCC) has issued several bulletins on computer disaster recov-
117. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.31a-2(f)(iii), 275.204-2(g)(iii); Amendment to Investment Adviser
Recordkeeping Rule, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 83,727 at 87,273
(Jan. 23, 1985) [hereinafter Amendment]; Adoption of an Amendment to an Investment
Company Act Recordkeeping Rule [1986-87 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
84,042A (Nov. 26, 1986) [hereinafter Adoption].
118. Adoption, supra note 117; Amendment, supra note 117.
119. Amendment, supra note 117 at 87, 274.
120. Id.
121. 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.31a-2(f)(ii),(iv), 275.204-2 (g)(ii), (iv).
122. See e.g., supra note 65 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
124. See generally Mitchell, Protecting Banks Against Failure of Data Processing,
N.Y.L.J., April 22, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Sherizen & Belisle, Begin Contingency Planning or You
Might Become an Outlaw, COMPUTERWORLD SPOTLIGHT No. 48, July 11, 1988, at S-10, col.
2.
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ery. 12 5 These bulletins recommend development of alternate data
processing capability for national banks, including off-site backup of
important files, critical software, and computer hardware.1 26 The
most recent bulletin recognizes computer disaster recovery as a nec-
essary extension of a bank's internal control and physical secur-
ity.12 7 Where banks are dependent on outside data processing, such
as a service bureau, the bank should review that vendor's contin-
gency plans.' 2' The OCC has also stated its policy of holding a
bank's board of directors responsible for an annual review of these
disaster recovery plans.'29 The OCC bulletins require that a bank's
plan be "testable", which seems to effectively preclude the use of
cold sites.' 30
In addition to the OCC bulletins, the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (FHLBB) has issued a memorandum requiring insured
institutions to develop disaster recovery plans.' 3 ' This memoran-
dum also recognizes disaster recovery plans as "an extension of in-
ternal control and physical security" measures. The memorandum
labels reciprocity agreements "not sufficient" as preparation for the
needs of savings institutions in a disaster, because of objections to
this option discussed above.1 32 Thus, in weighing disaster recovery
considerations, at least two planning options appear foreclosed to
executives of regulated savings institutions.133
Uniform Commercial Code - The Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) governs commercial transactions; it has been enacted
in whole or in part by every state legislature.' 3 4 Section 4 of the
UCC limits the amount of time a bank has available to return a
dishonored check.'13  The bank is required to exercise ordinary care
125. Comptroller of the Currency, Administrator of National Banks, Banking Circular
BC-177 (April 16, 1987). See also Koselka, supra note 1, at 80; Mitchell, supra note 124;
Stamps, supra note 21, at 63.
126. See Mitchell, supra note 124, at 6, col. 3.
127. Banking Circular BC-177, supra note 125, at 1.
128. Id. The OCC has taken action against at least one service that offered outside data
processing to banks, charging that the service's computer disaster recovery plans were inade-
quate. Cease and Desist Order Entered Against National Bank EDP Provider, [1984-84 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 1 86,238 (Oct. 10, 1985).
129. Id. See also Koselka, supra note 1, at 80; Stamps, supra note 21, at 63.
130. See Koselka, supra note 1, at 80.
131. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Office of Examinations and Supervision, Memo-
randum R-67 (Sept. 4, 1986). See also Melia, supra note 13, at S-72; Regulations, supra note
61, at 115.
132. Memorandum R-67, supra note 131.
133. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
134. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 4-101 to 8-406, U.L.A., at iii (1977).
135. See U.C.C. §§ 4-301, 4-302(5) (1977).
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in determining whether to dishonor and return a check.13 6 Failure
to return a dishonored check within the prescribed time limit, the
so-called "midnight deadline," leaves the bank liable for the amount
of the check, less the sum unrecoverable even had ordinary care
been exercised in collection.137 U.C.C. § 4-108 permits a bank to
exceed the midnight deadline if its normal operations are disrupted
by natural disasters or certain other circumstances beyond the
bank's control.38 The bank must take "reasonable" measures and
"exercise such diligence as the circumstances require" to prepare
for such circumstances. 39 Comment 4 to this section states that
only this measure of diligence in the face of a disaster such as an
"act of God" excuses the bank from liability.1 "°
Courts interpreting this provision have considered the question
of equipment failure as an unforeseeable circumstance beyond the
bank's control. In Blake v. Woodford Bank & Trust Co., a bank was
unable to return a dishonored check before the midnight deadline
because of mechanical equipment failure and an unusually heavy
workload.1 41 The court found, however, that a heavy workload
over the Christmas holidays was foreseeable; in addition, the ma-
chinery in question had broken down before. 42 The court found
the bank liable because it could reasonably have taken steps to
avoid the delay.
143
This standard has been applied to cases of computer break-
down. The Montana Supreme Court considered a case in which a
bank failed to return a dishonored check in time due to circum-
136. See U.C.C. § 4-103(3) (1977).
137. See U.C.C. §§ 4-104(1)(h), 4-103(5) (1977).
138. U.C.C. § 4-108(2) (1977).
139. U.C.C. § 4-108 reads in pertinent part:
(2) Delay by a collecting bank or payor bank beyond time limits prescribed or permit-
ted by this act or by instructions is excused if caused by interruption of communication facili-
ties, suspension of payments by another bank, war, emergency conditions or other
circumstances beyond the control of the bank provided it exercises such diligence as the
circumstances require.
140. The Official Comment to this section states, in pertinent part:
This section operates, however, only in the types of situation specified. Examples of
these situations include blizzards, floods, or hurricanes, and other "Act of God" events or
conditions, and wrecks or disasters .... When delay is sought to be excused under this
subsection the bank must "Exercise such diligence as the circumstances require" and it has
the burden of proof. U.C.C. § 4-108(2), comment 4 (1977).
141. Blake v. Woodford Bank & Trust Co., 555 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). See
also Brown, Some Current Litigation Issues Arising from the Use of Computer Systems in the
Rendering of Financial Services, COMPUTER L. & PRAC., Mar./Apr. 1988, at 119.
142. Id. at 596.
143. Id.
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stances including a flood and computer malfunction.", The court
found the bank liable in that instance, because the relationship be-
tween the parties was extraordinary, requiring more than ordinary
care.'4 5 Presumably, had the relationship required only ordinary
care, the bank would have been excused from liability. However, a
computer breakdown of twenty-four hours has been held not to jus-
tify a check processing delay of four days. 146 One court has gone so
far as to rule that the inability of a bank to process a check by
computer does not constitute sufficient emergency to excuse the
bank from returning a dishonored check in a timely fashion; the
court implied that, in the absence of functional computer equip-
ment, the bank should perhaps have processed the checks by
hand!"
Planning and implementation of computer disaster recovery
measures appear to help a bank meet the necessary standard of care
to avoid liability in these cases. In Port City State Bank v. American
Nat'l Bank, a bank failed to return a check within the prescribed
U.C.C. time limits because of computer equipment failure, but was
relieved of liability under § 4-108.148 In that case, the bank had
previously entered a reciprocity agreement with another firm; upon
failure of its own equipment, the bank implemented measures to
transfer its electronic data processing functions to the backup
site. 14  The bank also implemented measures to repair its own
equipment.150 The court found the computer breakdown to be a
circumstance beyond the bank's control;"' it also found that the
bank had exercised due diligence both in its attempts to repair the
computer, 152 and in its implementation of the disaster recovery
plan. 153 In a more recent case, a New York court found a bank
liable for not developing some computer disaster recovery plan
before a foreseeable computer breakdown. 54 The court stated that
144. Sun River Cattle Co, Inc. v. Miners Bank, 164 Mont. 287, 521 P.2d 679 (1974); see
also First Wyo. Bank, N.A. v. Cabinet Craft Distrib., Inc., 624 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1981).
145. Sun River, 521 P.2d at 689.
146. N.C. Nat'l Bank v. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 449 F. Supp. 616 (D.S.C. 1976), aff'd, 573
F.2d 1305 (4th Cir. 1978).
147. Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Bank of Mid-Jersey, 499 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (D.NJ.
1980), aff'd, 659 F.2d 1065 (3rd Cir. 1981).
148. Port City State Bank v. Am. Nat'l Bank, 486 F.2d 196 (10th Cir. 1973).
149. Id. at 198.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 200.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Congress Factors Corp. v. Extebank, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1559, 1560
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982).
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the bank in question had not exercised due diligence' when it failed
to develop alternate check processing systems in light of previous
computer failures. 155
While these cases do not deal specifically with preparations for
data processing systems recovery in a natural disaster, they do dis-
cuss the question of liability for computer malfunction. In defining
reasonable precautions under the UCC, these decisions employ
standards of foreseeability and ordinary care derived from tort law.
However, damages recoverable under these statutes are severely cir-
cumscribed; where losses are limited to the face value of a dishon-
ored check, there is little potential for serious economic harm.
Electronic Funds Transfer Act - The Electronic Funds Trans-
fer Act (EFTA) was designed to protect consumers from at least
some of the financial losses that could result from increased depen-
dence on electronic data processing. 156 Among its other safeguards,
the act makes banks liable for actual damages proximately caused
by failing to transfer the correct sum of money in a timely fash-
ion.157 As under UCC section 4, though, the bank is excused from
liability where the transfer is disrupted by an "act of God," that is,
some disaster beyond the bank's control.1 58 The bank must have
taken reasonable precautions against such an event.159 While no
reported case has yet interpreted this provision of the act, the lan-
guage and nature of the statute indicate that the standard for "rea-
sonable" should closely parallel the term's meaning under the
language of U.C.C. § 4-108(b). This standard of reasonable precau-
tions will certainly take into account provisions made for disaster
recovery. 1
60
Unlike the UCC, the EFTA authorizes recovery of all damages
155. Id. at 1560.
156. See generally Broadman, Electronic Fund Transfer Act: Is the Consumer Pro-
tected?, 13 U.S.F. L. REv. 245, 260-61 (1979); Budnitz, Problems of Proof When There's a
Computer Goof Consumers v. ATU's, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 49, 73 (1980); Katskee & Wright,
An Overview of the Legal Issues Confronting the Establishment of Electronic Funds Transfer
Services, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 7, 21 (1980).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1693h(a)(1) (1982).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1693h(b) reads in pertinent part: AcTs OF GOD AND TECHNICAL
MALFUNCTIONS
(b) A financial institution shall not be liable under subsection (a)(1) or (2) of this sec-
tion if the financial institution shows by a preponderance of the evidence that its action or
failure to act resulted from -
(1) an act of God or other circumstance beyond its control, that it exercised reasonable
care to prevent such an occurrence, and that it exercised such diligence as the circumstances
required ...
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1693h(b)(1) (1982).
160. See Broadman, supra note 156, at 260-61.
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proximately caused by the bank's failure.'61 The magnitude of pos-
sible harm in electronic funds transfer is perhaps greater than that
in handling checks. However, the EFTA applies only to consumer
transactions; no similar provision has been made for commercial
electronic funds transfers. 62 Such transactions fall outside the
scope of both the UCC and EFTA; they are governed by principles
of contract law.163 Commercial firms relying on electronic funds
transfer must therefore contractually distribute any liability for
losses among themselves. The consumer who relies on electronic
funds transfer is not in a strong bargaining position, and so is pro-
tected under the EFTA." Part III examines how courts have dis-
tributed corporate liability in the absence of such statutory
provisions.
III. COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE
While courts have not directly addressed the question of com-
puter disaster preparation, several broad rules of duty and liability
for corporations and their agents are firmly established. The doc-
trines are fairly uniform, with some minor variation between juris-
dictions. Many states have codified these doctrines; occasionally
they may be modified by local statutory provisions."' These rules
may be applied to the specific question at hand, forming the basis
for a particular theory of tort liability for losses in data processing
disasters.
A. Liability of Corporations
Corporations, as legal entities, are generally liable for negligent
acts just the same as other individuals.' 66 Corporations, however,
can only act through their officers, directors, or agents. 167 Corpora-
tions may be held liable for the negligent acts of their agents if the
161. 15 U.S.C. § 1693h(a) (1982).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1693h (1982).
163. See Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 955 (1982).
164. See Katskee & Wright, supra note 156.
165. See Special Project, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loy-
alty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REv. 605, 608 n.15 (1987) (authored by
Marcia M. McMurray).
166. See eg., Garcia v. San Gabriel Ready Mixt, 155 Cal. App. 2d 568, 572, 318 P.2d
145, 148 (1957); Grow Farms Corp. v. Nat'l State Bank, 167 N.J. Super. 102, 400 A.2d 535,
538 (1979); Garafano v. Neshobe Beach Club, Inc., 126 Vt. 566, 569, 238 A.2d 70, 73 (1967).
167. See eg., Fort Worth Elevator Co. v. Russel, 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1934); O'Shea v. Pac. Gas & Elec., 18 Cal. App. 2d 32, 39, 62 P.2d 1066, 1070 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1936).
Vol. 5
FAILURE TO PREPARE
agent is acting within the scope of his corporate responsibilities;16
often, both the agent and the corporation will be liable for such
acts.169 Where the corporation owes a third party a duty, and the
corporate agent fails to perform that duty, the injured party may
recover for the omission. 170 Recovery, however, has been tradition-
ally awarded only for physical damages; awards for pecuniary losses
are usually granted only where the corporation is acting as a fiduci-
ary or trustee. 17 1 Presumably, then, under the traditional common
law standard, a corporation might be found liable for failure to pro-
vide computer recovery measures where the person or property of
an outside party was physically damaged by the failure to act. This
standard would define a rather narrow range of liability to outside
parties. As discussed in Part IV, certain policy considerations indi-
cate that this standard should be broadened for computer disaster
recovery. 172
B. Liability of Corporate Executives
Liability to the corporation - Under the common law, the
legal responsibilities of a corporation's directors and officers include
a fiduciary duty to the corporation. 173 These executives must there-
fore exercise due care to safeguard corporate assets; 174 this responsi-
bility includes a duty to see that clear and accurate records are kept
to prevent fraud.1 75 Officers and directors who neglect their fiduci-
ary duty to the corporation become liable to the corporation or to
the shareholders for the losses incurred.'
76
168. See eg., Crittendon v. State Oil Co., 78 Ill. App. 2d 112, 222 N.E.2d 561 (1966).
169. See eg., Dunbar v. Demaree, 2 N.E.2d 1003, 1009 (Ind. App. 1936); O'Shea, 62
P.2d at 1070.
170. In re Sabbatino & Co., 150 F.2d 101 (2nd Cir..1945). See e.g., Mortimer v. Farm-
ers' Mutual Fire and Lighting Ins. Ass'n, 249 N.W. 405, 407 (Iowa 1933); Electric Supply
Co. v. Rosser, 214 P. 1068 (1923).
171. See Mortimer, 249 N.W. at 407.
172. See infra notes 226-230 and accompanying text.
173. See e.g., In re Adams Lab, 3 Bankr. 495 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Professional Hockey Corp. v. World Hockey Ass'n,
143 Cal. App. 3d 410, 191 Cal. Rptr. 773, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Bayer v. Beran, 49
N.Y.S. 2d 2, 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944); see also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPO-
RATIONS 627 (3rd ed. 1983).
174. See eg., Atlantic Accoustical & Insulation Co. v. Moreira, 348 A.2d 263 (Me.
1975); see generally Special Project, supra note 165, at 607.
175. See e.g., Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d 357, 364 (D. Minn. 1927); Hollander v.
Breeze Corp., 131 N.J. Eq. 585, 26 A.2d 507, 519 (N.J. Ch. 1941), aff'd, 131 N.J. Eq. 613, 26
A.2d 522 (N.J. 1942).
176. See e.g., Sternberg v. Blaine, 179 Ark. 448, 449, 17 S.W.2d 286, 288 (1929); Magale
v. Fomby, 132 Ark. 289, 201 S.W. 278 (1918); Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight, 292 Mass. 1,
197 N.E. 649 (1935); see also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 173, at 624.
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In managing the affairs of a corporation, the directors and of-
ficers are held to a standard of ordinary care.177 Courts in different
jurisdictions have defined this standard in two different ways; one
definition describes a more objective standard, the other a more sub-
jective standard. 178  In some jurisdictions, courts have found that
ordinary care means the care that would be exercised by a prudent
person in the same circumstances. 179  Other courts hold ordinary
care to mean the care the executives in question would exercise in
managing their own affairs.18
Under either definition, officers and directors are not insurers
of corporate assets, and are not liable for errors made in good
faith." ' Courts have widely applied this "good faith" standard in
the form of the business judgment rule.182 Corporate executives are
not liable to the corporation for losses where they have made an
informed business judgment.8 3 The business judgment rule applies
except in cases where fraud or gross negligence on the part of the
executives is shown.' 8 4 The business judgment rule is also limited
to cases of an actual judgment; failure to make an informed business
judgment has been held to constitute gross negligence.' 85 Thus, in-
action by officers and directors does not fall within the purview of
177. See e.g., Bourne v. Perkins, 42 F.2d 94, 99 (8th Cir. 1930); Chicago Title & Trust
Co. Munday, 297 Ill. 555, 131 N.E. 103 (Sup. Ct. Ill. 1921); Prudential Trust Co. v. Brown,
271 Mass. 132, 171 N.E. 42 (1930); Casey v. Woodruff 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (N.Y. App. Div.
1944); Williams v. Fidelity Loan, 142 Va. 43, 128 S.E. 615 (1925).
178. See generally Comment, Director Liability Under the Business Judgment Rule: Fact
or Fiction?, 35 Sw. L.J. 775 (1981) (authored by Michele H. Ubelaker).
179. See e.g., Weidner v. Engelhart, 176 N.W.2d 509, 518 (N.D. 1970); see also generally
Comment, supra note 178, at 787; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 178, at 622-23.
180. See e.g., Ashby v. Peters, 128 Neb. 338, 258 N.W. 639, 99 A.L.R. 843 (1953); Si-
mon v Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 203, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270, 273 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1942), aff'd, 267 A.D. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944); see also generally Comment, supra note
178, at 787.
181. See e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979); Weidner, 176
N.W.2d 509; Prudential Trust Co., 171 N.E. 142; Simon, 179 Misc. at 203, 38 N.Y.S.2d at
273; Bayer, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 5-6; see also generally Comment, supra note 178, at 792.
182. See eg., Gearhart v. Smith Intern, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 719 (5th Cir. 1984); Kelley
v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878 (Del. 1970); Bayer, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 6; see also generally Special Project,
supra note 165, at 613; Comment, supra note 178.
183. See e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 879; Eldridge v. Tymshare, Inc., 186 Cal. App.
3d 767, 776, 230 Cal. Rptr. 815, 820 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); see also H. HENN & J. ALEXAN-
DER, supra note 173, at 661.
184. See eg., Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 530 (Del. 1987); Rettinger v. Pierpont,
145 Neb. 161, 15 N.W.2d 393, 412 (1944); see also Lewis v. Anderson 615 F.2d 778, 781-82
(9th Cir. 1979).
185. See eg., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872; see also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra
note 173, at 625.
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this rule.18 6
Officers and directors of a corporation are therefore liable for
the consequences of their failure to act.1 87 Failure to exercise rea-
sonable supervision and be informed of corporate affairs constitutes
negligence."18 Ignorance or want of knowledge carries the same lia-
bility for corporate officers and directors as does failure to act. 8 9
Specific losses due to inattention are actionable as a tort of omis-
sion;' 90 directors and officers are responsible for those losses due to
omission.191 Presumably, then, officers and directors of a corpora-
tion would be liable under the common law standard for failure to
consider and make an informed business judgment concerning their
firm's computer disaster recovery options.
Liability to outside parties - Generally, the officers and direc-
tors of a corporation will not be personally liable for injuries to
third parties if their actions were undertaken in their capacities as
corporate executives. 192 However, this rule has certain notable ex-
ceptions. These corporate executives become personally liable if
they directed or participated in the tort.19 Officers and directors
are also liable for their failure to act where they owe a duty to the
outside party, and not merely to the corporation.' 94 Duties that are
owed to a third party rather than to the corporation fall outside the
186. See eg., Casey, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625; see also Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828,
852, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 401-408 (1965).
187. See eg., Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 490, 505, 229 Cal.
Rptr. 456, 464, 723 P.2d 573, 580 (1986); Chicago Title & Trust Co., 297 Ill. 555, 131 N.E.
103; see also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 173, at 621; Fisher v. Parr, 92 Md. 245,
48 A. 621 (1901); Olin Matheson Chem. Corp. v. Planters Corp., 236 S.C. 318, 326, 114
S.E.2d 321 (1960).
188. See b.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814, 821 (1981); Olin
v. Matheson, 114 S.E.2d 321; Casey, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625; see also Hornsby v. Internal Revenue
Serv., 588 F.2d 952, 953 (5th Cir. 1979).
189. See eg., Prudential Trust Co., 171 N.E. 42, 44; Ashby v. Peters, 128 Neb. 338, 258
N.W. 639, 644 (1939); see also Bowerman v. Hamner, 250 U.S. 504, 511 (1919).
190. See eg., Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
191. See e.g., Fisher, 92 Md. 245, 48 A. 621; see also Medford Trust Co. v. McKnight,
197 N.E. 649, 655 (Mass. 1935); Magale, 132 Ark. 289, 201 S.W. 278.
192. See e.g., In re Knight, 60 Ill. App. 2d 457, 460, 208 N.E.2d 679, 681 (Ill. 1965);
Michaels v. Lispenard Holding Corp., 201 N.Y.S.2d 611, 614, 11 A.D.2d 12, 14, (N.Y. App.
Div. 1960); see also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 173 at 625; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 352 (1958).
193. See e.g., Levi v. Schwartz, 201 Md. 575, 95 A. 2d 322, 36 A.L.R. 2d 1241 (1953);
Sternberg, 17 S.W.2d at 288; United States Liability Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal.
3d 586, 595, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 423, 463 P.2d 770, 775 (1970).
194. See e.g., Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., I Cal. 3d at 586, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 423, 463 P.2d at
775; Frances T., 723 P.2d at 582; Adams v. Fiduciary Casualty Co., 107 So. 496, 502 (La. Ct.
App. 1958); Michaels, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 614, 11 A.D.2d at 14; see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 354 comment a (1958).
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protection of the business judgment rule.t"' Such a duty is gener-
ally found when the corporation in question is a bank or similar
institution that holds funds in trust; 9 ' the executives of such insti-
tutions have been held to owe a fiduciary duty directly to the depos-
itors.' 7 Occasionally, this duty may be owed to creditors,
especially where the bank has become insolvent.' 9 8  In rare in-
stances a corporation other than a bank or trust may owe creditors
such a duty.'99 Where the duty exists, though, recovery from each
executive depends upon proving that particular executive personally
negligent. 2" In addition, damages for purely pecuniary losses have
traditionally not been awarded unless the corporation in question is
a bank.2° ' Thus, like the corporation itself,202 corporate officers and
directors who fail to take adequate computer disaster recovery
measures would be liable to outside parties only for physical dam-
ages where the executives directly owed the third party a duty of
care. In Part IV, we examine the implications and adequacy of this
standard in light of the purposes of tort law.
IV. A THEORY OF LIABILITY
As described above, the liability of negligent corporations and
their executives has traditionally been fairly limited. Yet, as dis-
cussed in the Introduction to this paper, negligence in computer
disaster recovery may create enormous losses to corporations, third
parties, and society in general. The statutes and regulations dis-
cussed in Part II fail to address this problem outside of certain spe-
cific instances. However, doctrines of tort law provide a basis for
addressing the problem through the common law.
A. Standards of Negligence
Statutory Standards - In our increasingly complex society,
different interests are bound to collide; tort law exists to compensate
195. See e.g., Frances T., 723 P.2d at 584.
196. See eg., Francis, 432 A.2d at 824.
197. See id. at 824; but see Chester-Cambridge Bank & Trust Co. v. Rhodes, 346 Pa.
427, 432, 31 A.2d 128, 131 (1943).
198. See e.g., Francis, 432 A.2d at 824; Sternberg, 17 S.W.2d at 288; but see Allen v.
Cochran, 160 La. 425, 107 So. 292 (1926); Chester-Cambridge, 363 Pa. 427, 432, 31 A.2d
128, 131 (1943).
199. See e.g., Veeser v. Robinson Hotel Co., 275 Mich. 133, 266 N.W. 54 (1936).
200. See e-g., Levi, 201 Md. 575; Frances T., 723 P.2d 573.
201. See e.g., Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d at 586, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 423, 463 P.2d at
775; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 357 (1958).
202. See supra notes 166-172 and accompanying text.
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those whose interests are unfairly injured is such clashes.2 °3 Courts
are often called upon to fashion novel remedies to compensate those
injured in novel situations. 2 4 In fashioning such remedies, courts
must determine which injuries deserve compensation; in tort law,
this is generally determined by finding a societally acceptable duty
of care which an offending party may have breached to cause an-
other injury.2 °5 Courts often find an applicable duty of care in the
standard set by legislative enactments or administrative regula-
tion.206 The statute or regulation adopted should be designed to
protect a defined class of persons from the particular harm that has
occurred.20 7 Where such statutes or regulations provide for civil
liability, the court awards the measure of damages prescribed.20 8
Where civil liability is not provided for, the court may find civil
liability to be implied in the statute's language.2 9 Or, if civil liabil-
ity is not implied, the court may simply adopt the legislative stan-
dard in fashioning a common law remedy.2
Courts have in this fashion found a duty for some institutions
to preserve and make available certain records. In Quinones v.
United States, a discharged employee claimed that his former em-
ployer had negligently lost or destroyed his personnel records, and
so injured his future job prospects.211 The court held that the em-
ployer had a duty to use reasonable care in maintaining personnel
records; the court based this holding on the standard required by a
federal administrative regulation.212 Similarly, courts have found a
hospital to have a duty to use reasonable care in keeping patients'
medical records.2  In Fox v. Cohen, a patient charged that a hospi-
tal had negligently lost or destroyed certain medical records, mak-
ing it impossible to prove malpractice 4.2 1  The Fox court found a
203. See Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238, 238 (1944).
204. Id.; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 3-4 (5th ed. 1984).
For recent examples of such developments, see infra notes 214 and 238-247.
205. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 204, at 4.
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 285-286 (1958).
207. Id.
208. Id. at § 285 comment b.
209. Id. at § 286 comment d.
210. Id. at § 285 comment c; see also Frederick L. v. Thomas, 578 F.2d 513 n. 8 (3rd
Cir. 1978) (though closely related, negligence per se is distinct from implied civil liability).
211. Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269 (3rd Cir. 1974).
212. Quinones, 492 F.2d at 1277. See also Bulkin v. Western Kraft East Inc., 422 F.
Supp. 437, 443 (E.D. Penn. 1976) (following Quinones).
213. Fox v. Cohen, 84 Ill. App. 3d 744, 406 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Bondu v.
Gurvich (Fla. App. 1984).
214. Fox, 406 N.E.2d at 182. Some courts have extended this approach to create a new
tort for spoilation of evidence. See Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 248,
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duty on the hospital's part to use reasonable care in maintaining
records; this duty was based on the standard set by administrative
regulations and hospital association standards.1 5
Through similar reasoning, the statutes and administrative reg-
ulations explored in Part II may provide the standard for mainte-
nance and accessibility of computer records. Quite apart from their
own penalties or requirements, such statutes and regulations define
acceptable standards for common law tort actions. The statutes
make adequate disaster recovery provisions an integral part of rea-
sonable care in preserving and maintaining computer records. 216
Some statutes, such as the EFTA or UCC provisions, provide for
civil actions; 217 where such a statute sets the applicable standard,
the court should adopt the measure of damages provided in the stat-
ute. 218 The FCPA, however, does not create a private cause of ac-
tion.21 9 Nonetheless, the FCPA protects a specific class of persons
from a particular harm, and may properly be applied to tort
suits. 220 Where such a statute sets the applicable standard the court
is free to award whatever measure of damages will compensate the
victim for his injury.221
If no statute sets an applicable standard, courts may look to
similar statutes and regulations for guidance in fashioning a duty of
care. 22 The decision making process discussed in Part I of this ar-
ticle constitutes a common thread in both the statutory and com-
mon law doctrines discussed in Parts II and III. In weighing the
costs and benefits of computer disaster recovery for a firm, a corpo-
rate officer or director makes the sort of judgment protected under
the business judgment rule.223 Such consideration of corporate op-
tions, regardless of the actual conclusion, is the sort of deliberation
necessary to ordinary care in managing corporate assets and pro-
tecting corporate records. 224 This standard closely parallels the
statutory requirements for reasonable safeguards and due care inte-
501 N.E.2d 1312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); see also generally Comment, Spoilation: Civil Liability
for Destruction of Evidence, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 191 (1985) (authored by Andrea H. Rowse).
215. Fox, 406 N.E.2d at 182-83.
216. See sources cited supra notes 107, 121, 141, and 148.
217. See sources cited supra notes 136 and 161.
218. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
220. By similar application, statutes such as the National Bank Act have provided a
standard for common law negligence actions. See Michelsen v. Penney 135 F.2d 409, 419
(2nd Cir. 1943); see also supra note 207 and accompanying text.
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 906 comment a (1965).
222. See sources cited supra note 210.
223. See supra notes 181-183 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 173-180 and accompanying text.
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gral to the FCPA, federal administrative regulations, and section 4
of the UCC.225
Such considerations have long been an important element in
assigning negligence liability. Judge Learned Hand, in the famous
Carroll Towing 226 case, suggested that judges and juries, in deter-
mining negligence, should evaluate the probability of the particular
harm occurring, the magnitude of the harm if it occurs, and the
countervailing costs of prevention.227 Judge Hand went so far as to
reduce this formula to a mathematical representation, suggesting
that where the product of the first two factors is greater than the
third factor, the tortfeasor was negligent in not taking precau-
tions. 228 Commentators such as Richard Posner have suggested
that this formula defines a method for minimizing societal costs,
making the label of "negligence" shorthand for a sort of legal cost/
benefit analysis. 229 Assignment of liability on the basis of negli-
gence thus serves to minimize societal costs by providing the proper
measure of incentive to deter unacceptable future harm.230
Limiting factors - Negligence in tort law is often assigned on
the basis of "foreseeability" and "notice." '231 These requirements
act as limiting factors on the scope of the negligence standard, but
weigh much the same considerations. Learned Hand's analysis can-
not be applied where the probability and magnitude of harm are
unforeseeable, and thus unmeasurable; thus a court may consider
whether circumstances were such that the tortfeasor should have
foreseen the possible harm in order to weigh it against the cost of
prevention.232 Similarly, the court may consider whether the
tortfeasor was aware or should have been aware of the particular
harm.233 These considerations also imply a requirement to weigh
the factors discussed in Part 1234, as illustrated by the application of
the foreseeability standard in the UCC cases.235
225. See supra notes 148-154 and accompanying text.
226. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947).
227. Id. at 173. See also Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611 (2nd Cir. 1940).
228. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
229. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972).
230. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 204, § 4, at 25-26.
231. See e.g., Gordon v. Am. Museum of Natural History, 67 N.Y.2d 836, 492 N.E.2d
774 (1986); Negri v. Stop & Shop, Inc, 65 N.Y.2d 625, 480 N.E.2d 740 (1985); Trimarco v.
Klein, 56 N.Y.2d 98, 436 N.E.2d 502 (1982).
232. See Evra Corp., 673 F.2d at 958 (Posner, J., discussing forseeability under Learned
Hand analysis); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291-293 (1965).
233. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290 (1965).
234. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 141-155 and accompanying text; see also Brown, supra note 141, at
122, n.7.
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Courts may also limit the scope of negligence liability by re-
quiring physical harm to the injured party or her property.236 Tra-
ditionally, recovery of purely economic damages was determined by
principles of contract law. 2 37 More recently, several courts have
recognized the importance of compensating victims for pecuniary
injuries; economic injury may be as damaging and as foreseeable as
physical injury.238 Developments in the law relating to negligent
performance of professional services show the evolution of such a
standard for third party recovery.239 Accountants, lawyers, insur-
ance adjusters, and other professionals were liable for negligent per-
formance of their responsibilities only where privity of contract or a
similar relationship existed. 2' More recently, courts in several ju-
risdictions have recognized that parties not in strict privity with
these professionals may rely on their performance.24' Thus, where
a professional fails to meet the statutory or professional standards
expected of her, she may be liable for economic harm to a third
party if she should reasonably have expected that party to rely on
her performance.242
This approach retains the limit of foreseeability, but allows
compensation to third parties who are economically injured. Such a
doctrine deserves consideration in fashioning a negligence standard
for computer disaster recovery. As discussed above, third party lia-
bility of negligent corporations or executives has traditionally been
severely circumscribed.243 However, outside parties are often in a
poor position to avoid losses when the electronic records main-
tained by a particular corporation become suddenly inaccessible.
236. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323, 324A (1965). See also sources
cited supra notes 171 and 201.
237. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 204, § 92, at 657.
238. See eg., People's Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 495
A.2d 107 (1985) (tort compensation for purely economic harm).
239. See eg., Selden v. Burnett, 754 P.2d 256 (Alaska 1988) (criteria for negligent ac-
countant's liability to third party) Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d
281 (Alaska 1980) (insurance adjuster found liable); First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Title
Serv. Inc., 457 So.2d 467 (Fla. 1984) (title abstracter liable); AlumaKraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer
Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (accountant liable); Annotation, What
Constitutes Negligence Sufficient to Render Attorney Liable to Person Other than Immediate
Client, 61 A.L.R. 4th 464, § 2, at 473-78 (1988) (increased attorney liability). See also Rosen-
blum Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 329, 461 A.2d 138, 143 (1983) (negligent accountant found
liable to third party).
240. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 189, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931); see
also Annotation, Liability of Public Accountant, 46 A.L.R. 3d. 979, 92 A.L.R. 3d. 396 (1988).
241. See sources cited supra note 239.
242. See id.
243. See sources cited supra notes 171 and 201.
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Generally, the corporation will be the cheapest cost avoider. 2 4
Thus, the foreseeable reliance of outside parties on a corporation's
computer records may be legitimately incorporated into a negli-
gence standard for computer disaster recovery.245
B. Applying the Standard
Liability to the corporation - Applying these standards to
computer disaster recovery planning, it would seem reasonable that
corporate officers and directors have an obligation to consider com-
puter disaster recovery options for their firm. Failure to consider
their firm's options and implement their conclusions is failure to
safeguard the firm's assets, particularly where information is con-
sidered a corporate asset.246 Such an omission is not protected by
the business judgment rule; it falls short of ordinary care to the re-
quired fiduciary duty.247 In most cases, corporate executives have
actual notice of foreseeable disasters through their firm's informa-
tion systems managers.248 Even where officers and directors have
not received actual notice of the importance of computer disaster
recovery planning, widespread publicity and government bulletins
concerning the subject should serve as constructive notice.249 Fail-
ure to consider a firm's options would therefore result in liability to
the corporation or shareholders for losses incurred in a data
processing disaster.
Reliance - Parties other than shareholders or the corporate
entity may suffer losses due to a corporation's failure to plan for a
data processing disaster.. As indicated above, officers and directors
are sometimes personally liable in such suits; more often, they will
be liable to the corporation for damages it pays in such suits.
250
The claims of creditors and similar parties against a corpora-
244. See supra notes 228-230 and accompanying text.
245. For discussion of several possible examples, see infra notes 254-265 and accompany-
ing text.
246. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 184-191, and accompanying text.
248. See sources cited supra note 20.
249. See e.g., Trimarco v. Klein, 56 N.Y.2d. 98, 436 N.E.2d 502 (1982).
250. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text. The traditional bulwark against
such liability, director liability insurance, has become prohibitively expensive because of the
recent expansion of director liability. See generally Mallen & Evans, Surviving the Directors'
and Officers'Liability Crisis: Insurance and the Alternatives, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 439 (1987);
Special Project, Protecting Corporate Directors and Officers: Insurance and Other Alterna-
tives, 40 VAND. L. REv. 775 (1987) (authored by Bennet L. Ross). Disaster recovery meas-
ures might contribute to lowering such costs, not only through loss prevention, but by
removing some negative factors which require such high costs. See Mallen & Evans, supra, at
468; see also supra note 9.
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tion or its executives are somewhat more attenuated than those of
shareholders against directors. Generally, these parties may re-
cover from corporations or from corporate executives only where
some physical harm has been inflicted upon the victim. 21 As dis-
cussed above, courts are reluctant to grant recovery for purely pecu-
niary losses unless the corporation and its agents were acting as
fiduciaries or trustees.25 2 This reluctance may stem from a desire to
limit liability for increasingly attenuated economic claims.253
Where physical harm has been inflicted, or where a fiduciary rela-
tionship exists, damage to the injured party is considered to be
clearly foreseeable. This suggests that third party suits for losses
due to lack of a computer disaster recovery plan might be limited to
claims against banks or similar financial institutions.
This doctrine may logically be extended beyond financial insti-
tutions, however. Information, as indicated above, has become a
valuable commodity in our society.254 No great stretch of the imag-
ination is required to see that firms that store valuable information
are in fact acting as trustees or fiduciaries to depositors of informa-
tion. Medical insurance records, for example, have an obvious
value to policyholders who are dependent upon such records to re-
ceive medical care. These records are stored by insurance firms as
electronic data files. 255 The negligent loss or inaccessibility of such
records due to failure of the firm or its executives to prepare for a
computer disaster might legitimately be regarded as the loss of a
valuable commodity that the policyholder has entrusted to the cor-
poration. Certainly the officers and directors of such a corporation
can foresee that harm may result if the records it holds become in-
accessible; they should be expected to take reasonable precautions
to prevent such harm. Similar arguments may readily be applied to
institutions holding educational records, credit records, or other in-
formation with obvious economic value.
The value of certain other electronic records is less obvious,
but reliance on those who hold them is equally foreseeable. The
scientific community has recently given serious thought to commit-
ting vast resources to mapping the human genetic sequence.256 The
251. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
252. Id.
253. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
255. See Rhodes, CICS Early Warning System Helps Keep Blue Cross & Blue Shield Up,
INFOSYSTEMS, March 1987, at 10.
256. See Roberts, Academy Backs Genome Project, 239 SCIENCE 725 (1988); Roberts,
New Sequencers to Take on the Genome, 238 SCIENCE 271 (1987).
[Vol. 5
8EILURE TO PREPARE
results of this massive undertaking would be stored as a computer
data base.2" 7 Similar scientific databases already exist, storing infor-
mation on topics such as AIDS research25 and drug interaction.2"9
Loss of such scientific information due to an unprepared-for com-
puter disaster would be tragic, not only as a scientific setback, but as
a waste of the resources already expended. A negligence standard
such as that under consideration could serve as an incentive to safe-
guard such data bases.260
Physical Harm - Even absent such a fiduciary obligation,
corporations might in many instances be found liable to certain
outside parties for negligently failing to safeguard their computer
operations. As discussed above, corporations and their agents are
held liable for failing to prevent physical harm to outside parties
who rely on them.26' Several of the databases discussed above, such
as medical insurance records, are critical to the physical well-being
of third parties. Tort compensation generally requires actual harm
to occur before a victim may be compensated; the possibility of fu-
ture harm is not enough.262 However, cases may arise where per-
sons suffer physical harm because certain critical records are lost or
become inaccessible in a computer disaster.
For example, one firm offers bracelets to persons with particu-
lar medical conditions; in an emergency where the person is uncon-
scious, health care personnel may call a telephone number on the
bracelet to obtain the victim's special medical history. 63 These
medical histories are stored as electronic data files. 264 If, because of
a computer disaster, these files were lost or even temporarily inac-
cessible, the victim relying on the bracelet service could die or suffer
serious injury. In such a case, the corporation has by contract as-
sumed a duty to the victim.2 65 Failure to take disaster recovery
measures could leave such a firm, its officers, and directors liable to
the victim or her heirs. Adequate computer disaster recovery plan-
257. See Roberts, Who Owns the Human Genome?, 237 SCIENCE 358, 359 (1987).
258. See Batch, AIDS research Project Buys Critical Time Savings With Communications
Pack, COMPUTERWVORLD, Aug. 3, 1987, at S-10, col. 1; see also Chester, CAIN and AIDS,
INFOSYSTEMS, July 1987, 28, 30.
259. See Stipp, Scientists Use Medical Record Data to Detect Adverse Side Effects of
Drugs, Wall St. J., March 24, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
260. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 171 and 201 and accompanying text.
262. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 204, § 30, at 165-68.
263. See Halcrow, A Benefit That Saves Money - and Lives, PERSONNEL J., Feb.'1987,
at 10 (describing Medic Alert service).
264. Id.
265. See eg., Texasgulf Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 610 F. Supp. 1329, 1350 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
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ning for corporations such as these would serve to forestall such
suits, protecting both corporations and those who rely on them.
CONCLUSION
As corporations become increasingly dependent on electronic
data processing operations, they become increasingly vulnerable to
data processing disasters. Natural disasters may cause loss of vital
computer functions or destruction of important corporate records;
such losses often result in vast economic losses to corporations and
third parties. In certain situations, such losses may result in physi-
cal harm to third parties. Statutes requiring disaster recovery plan-
ning by corporations may create criminal liability for some
executives, but have generally not addressed the issue of economic
loss. Corporations and corporate executives who fail to take ade-
quate computer disaster recovery measures may also be found
civilly liable for negligence. By formulating such a negligence stan-
dard, courts can permit tort law to function as a deterrent to these
potentially large societal losses.
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